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Abstract. The are at least two main examination aspects of Hungarian public administration and 
administrative law: first the approach sketching the main features of the broader legal system and of 
law enforcement practice, second – almost as importantly – the examination which describes and 
assesses 'reality' in a wider social scientific framework and through (public) policy features and 
processes. It shall be stated that legal approaches and analysis methods are dominant in the self-
image of Hungarian public administration, in its practical operation and in its scientific description 
attempts. Among both the general features of the legal system reflected in administrative law and in 
its broader public policy features there are some which are relatively stable – providing a high level 
of security even in case of certain political and legal changes. We call them “elements of our 
administrative heritage”: 
a) the first such 'heritage-element' is tradition, which is kept alive by social memory and goes 
beyond itemised law. Today it may be observed in deep structural continuity, the further effects of 
certain civil values, and in typical ways of thinking and attitudes. 
b) in the second place there is the language (linguistic) environment, the framework which with its 
highly regulated nature keeps together and from several aspects determines certain features of, and 
the dogma of, public administration. 
c) as third factor we may mention the most obvious heritage-element in close relationship with the 
first two: institutions which are permanently present in itemised law, those specific administrative 
solutions, which are stable and – in some cases – returning elements of Hungarian legal history. 
Regarding the latter the issue of the historical constitution may be mentioned, which has become an 
exciting problem of 'living law' in Hungary with the approval of the Fundamental Law of Hungary. 
Naturally, there are not only internal, but also (stable) external effects, influencing public 
administration. 
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I. Introduction 
 
During the presentation of Hungarian public administration and administrative law the 
consideration of at least two examination aspects is necessary: first the approach sketching the main 
features of the law system, the broader legal system and of law enforcement practice is reasonable, 
second – almost as importantly – the examination which describes and assesses 'reality' in a wider 
social scientific framework and through (public) policy features and processes. At the same time, it 
makes it possible to compare the Hungarian administrative phenomena with the similar phenomena 
of other countries, which may provide more objective results.1 
 
Among both the general features of the legal system reflected in administrative law and in its 
broader public policy features there are some which are relatively stable – providing a high level of 
security even in case of certain political and legal changes. 
 
II. The traditional features of Hungarian public administration in public policy approach 
 
A starting point of this subchapter is that new Central-Eastern-European democracies established 
after 1989 did not build the political system on layered, sophisticated consultation procedures and 
institutional systems based on wide scale social participation, but – almost exclusively – on the 
Parliament-centred formation of political structures based on the principle of representation. Many 
believe that one of the great problems of societies getting out from under a dictatorship is that due 
to the lack of civil society filling in the space between individuals and the state during their 
socialisation, the members of these societies could never naturally learn to incorporate the 
identification of problems, formulation of their interests, exchange their thoughts, the harmonisation 
of different opinions, due to which the various problem-handling methods were not developed, 
either. From the public policy side it may be stated that in Hungary the legal and institutional 
requirements of representative democracy were fulfilled after 1990, but since then no material 
change has happened towards participative democracy; this means that Hungarian democracy “has 
frozen into” the level of representative democracy.2  
A father tendency, a feature which may be hardly separated from the one mentioned earlier is that 
the all-time state – formed after the transition – imitates, reconstructs and replaces the civil sector 
through its conscious efforts, by this making it weaker (more about this later). During the analysis 
of this, it must not be forgotten that in the economic and sociological literature of the past one or 
                                                          
1 See e.g. Künnecke 2010, 266.  
2 Jenei 2010, 95. 
two decades the state, by undertaking the 'replacement' and 'simulation' of the organisation of 
market and self-regulating social mechanisms and the political organisation of society, it eventually 
hampers the connection between political decision-making mechanisms and the actual 
fragmentation of the interests of society. 
 
Based on the main features of public policy/administrative environment it must be stated about 
Hungary in advance that a) due to the traditional 'from top-down' system, a general – and tendency-
like – weakness is the lack of democratic control, accountability and transparency; b) due to the 
politicised and unstable practice of the reconciliation of interests, the quality of the decisions made 
in the public sector are often insufficient, as is their execution; c) public policy has balance 
problems; the weight and coordination of the relevant players is disproportionate and incalculable 
due to the extreme politicisation, and political predominance characterises the relationship of the 
political-administrative system and society, regardless 3 ; d) the final phase of public policy is 
missing; public policy processes begin but they often do not get to the end. There is no evaluation 
phase and closure. 4  Within the scope of the latter evaluation the preliminary and subsequent 
(posterior) impact studies (law-reviews) are determinative, the main goal of which is grounding the 
decision-making situation of the legislator, in so far the analysis expands the pool of factors the 
consideration of which is – or should be – essential for well thought-through, grounded decision.5  
 
It should also be mentioned here that in the modernization of Hungarian public administration – 
according to the standards of Western reform trends – the deficiencies of the balance of state and 
market are continuous; 6  and in the Hungarian model of public policy decision making – as  
mentioned before – the 'top-down' approach is dominant, in so far as the institutional mechanisms 
of the involvement of interest protection-integrative organisations operate only formally. 7  It is 
inseparable from the latter fact that the traditional features of Hungarian political culture are 
paternalism, intolerance and the transformation of personal relations into political ones,8 and last, 
but not least the presence of corruption phenomena, which may be observed at a degree exceeding 
the average of the surrounding area.9 Among the classic governmental failure phenomena – which 
is not traditionally Hungarian, but may definitely be observed here – the theoretical difficulties of 
setting and measuring public policy goals may be mentioned, as well as influence of strong interest 
groups, difficulties related to the size and complexity of governmental activities, and to the causal 
                                                          
3 Jenei 2010, 95. 
4 Pesti 2001, 206. 
5 In details see: A Közigazgatás Korszerűsítésének kormánybiztosa által készített szempontok. „Részletes útmutató a 
hatályos jogszabályok utólagos és jogszabálytervezetek előzetes felülvizsgálatához.” [Aspects prepared by the 
government commissioner of the Modernization of public administration. 'Detailed guide to the subsequent review 
of valid laws and the preliminary review of draft laws'] 1995, 5. 
6 Jenei 2010, 94. 
7 Jenei 2010, 95.. 
8 Kulcsár 1987, 336.  
9 http://www.ey.com/HU/hu/Newsroom/News-releases/global_fraud_survey_2010_pr > accessed 11 July 2013 
interconnection of certain public policy problems.10 
It is also important that in Hungary '[the] all-time present seems to be outstanding because of the 
strong delegitimization of the all-time past, making it seem worthless, instead of focusing on its 
own achievements'. 11  In this field of force even the changes of the government are of the 
significance of 'catastrophe history'. However, attention must be also directed to the fact that the 
phenomena of value crisis known in sociology often appears in society along such fights for 
legitimacy…12 
The processes of the two decades after the Hungarian transition (1990-2010) may be exemplified 
with two further paradoxes: 
 
1. The integration of the Hungarian economy to the global market happened without the whole 
Hungarian economy catching up.  
2. The continuous weakening of the state and the lack of the material reform of the state budget 
together led to the result that a large, but ineffective state was established. 'The Hungarian 
state model is too large to be a night watch state, but too powerless to be a welfare state. 
This model could best be called a 'speed bump state', because it spreads out to several fields 
of economy and society, but it is not there where its power and organisational skills would 
be most needed; regarding its intentions it protects, but in reality it holds back processes, 
wants to prevent bad things but eventually it may be disregarded, passed by'.13 
 
Parts of public policy models and directions applied since the transition have performed rather 
ambiguously. Privatisation and the realisation of public procurement risks have stored up much 
social deficit, as has the frequent overstepping by executive power of the system of checks and 
balances, and the depletion of the actual and potential human resources of the public sector.14 'It 
may be concluded that the 'market turn' reduced to privatisation and outsourcing did not result in 
real market competition at the end of the 20th century and at the beginning of the 21st. The 
monopoly of public institutions was often replaced by private monopoly. The privatisation of public 
services resulted in the establishment of the client system and outsourcing often became the source 
of increased corruption. (…) This way the effectiveness of public services was not significantly 
increased by the use of market mechanisms. The publicly known idea, according to which in public 
services private enterprises are more effective than public institutions, has not been proven in any 
countries of the modern world.' 15  The embeddedness of such ideas was strengthened by the 
neoclassic economic approach, according to which the state shall intervene only in the field of those 
activities and services – like defence, education, public and property safety, protection of the 
environment – where market is not efficient or does not work at all. '(…) Until very recently it was 
                                                          
10 Hajnal 2008, 33. 
11 Szigeti 2008, 17. 
12 Szigeti 2008, 17. 
13 Pulay 2010, 29.  
14 Horváth 2011, 92. 
15 Jenei 2010, 95-96.  
assumed in Hungary that regarding their significance, tasks performed by the state are behind the 
activities fulfilled by private enterprises in line with market instructions.'16  
 
In the 1990s – after the transition – there was a regrettable shift: during the transition to a market 
economy, the state withdrew from a number of fields, but during this 'abolishment of the state' 
several tasks could not be exposed to the profit-oriented processes of the market. These tasks were 
usually incorporated to the so-called non-profit sector, which was unfortunately mixed up with the 
sphere of civil organisations both legally and practically: 'It often happened that in complete sectors 
only the signboards were repainted, shifted from state to public utility status, while the old structure, 
the old system of operation, state financing and the old 'expert' staff remained.'17 This environment, 
however, had a weakening effect on organised civil society, upholding its – unnecessarily strong – 
dependant status. 
 
The result of the 'abolishment of the state' after the transition was quite odd, because for the 
establishment of the rule of law, the tool system of public administration was weakened on purpose, 
while from the other side the need for public services provided or organised by public 
administration did not decrease.18 However, the 'rediscovery' of the state is not a direction to be 
absolutised: if the state performed all of its tasks through a central bureaucracy, it could hardly 
escape critical remarks about a total – and what is more important, less effective – state. Basically 
this is the reason why the tasks acknowledged or undertaken by the state are only partially 
performed by the state, in line with the principle of subsidiary, it often relies on the organisations of 
the economic and civil sector, as well as – with growing significance – on the assistance of church 
organisations.  
 
In addition to the traditional public policy question, asking which activities belong to the catalogue 
of public tasks, it is also important who performs these and under what authorisation and state 
support. Within the scope of presenting Hungarian public administration ideas, the analysis of the 
staff number and number of public administration institutions of the past two decades is very 
important, which – often – presents these as practical competition between the aspects of efficiency 
and effectiveness.19 The governmental cycle after 2010 brought about some novelties in this sense, 
in so far as it obviously refused some of the solutions favoured by public management: the abolition 
of PPP-constructions within the solutions of the performance of public services started, the 
obligatory private pension fund system was abolished and the sector neutral state approach came to 
an end, even as a sceptical approach may be observed about the outsourcing of human public 
services.20 
 
                                                          
16 Csáki 2009, 13-14. 
17 Pankucsi 2012, 144. 
18 Nagy Marianna 2011, 203-204.  
19 Gellén 2012, 14.  
20 Horváth 2011, 93.  
As a summary it may be stated that in the development of society in the past twenty years the 
dominance of political and subjective factors may be observed, contrary to other – economic, social, 
legal, EU integration – factors.21 This approach may be still upheld even though an important 
element of the renewal process of governmental goals and methods was the transformation of the 
financing system of public sector, and in general it is (was) true that public administration reforms 
usually start(ed) due to budget/financial reasons in Hungary. 
 
III. Traditional features of Hungarian legal system 
 
The Hungarian legal system may be characterised as part of the 'Western law legal type', within 
which it may be put into the continental law family.22 However, the statements of works23 raising 
the issue of belonging to the so-called post-Socialist law family are also justified, in so far as 
operational mechanisms typical of the members of this family of law can be seen.24 
 
It shall be repeatedly stated that legal approaches and analysis methods are dominant in the self-
image of Hungarian public administration, in its practical operation and in its scientific description 
attempts.25  It is a tendency which had existed earlier, but was strengthened by Socialism: the 
transformation of any social fact or conflict into one of legal nature – along with a relatively low 
level of legal consciousness of citizens, and strengthened by other factors – increases the richness in 
information of hierarchical system of relations, ensures the continuous reproduction of all kinds of 
dependencies and the upholding of fear/citizens’ passivity, as well as the relativisation of the 
personal responsibility of the decision-maker/politician/law enforcer.  
 
The Hungarian legal system, the broader legal system and legal thinking has always been 
characterised by strong German and Austrian orientation, due in part to the geographical features 
and certain cultural-historical features of Hungary. However, in addition to this, it is obvious that in 
the approaches of some of those dealing with the science of law or economics – from the beginning 
– other directions may also be observed, and therefore we may talk about French, in a given period 
Russian, and with periodical intensity Anglo-Saxon (American) influence. In Hungarian public law 
                                                          
21 Szigeti 2011, 24.  
22 Among the characteristics of legal systems belonging to the continental law family it may be highlighted that 
written law has primacy over case law. The laws regulate the relations of life in an abstract way, they form a closed 
system. The functions of the legislator and of the law enforcer are sharply divided. The judge does not make law, 
but rather precedents only make the application of law clearer. This rule prevails even if some authors correctly 
point out the precedential features of the uniformity decisions of the Curia, i.e. that they have the characteristics of 
individual sources of law (see e.g. Szalma 2011, 41.) As part of the continental legal system, the Hungarian legal 
system does not recognise binding precedents. However, lower courts are generally bound by the harmonised 
decisions of the Supreme Court/Curia ('Kúria') and of the interpretations issued by the Constitutional Court 
('Alkotmánybíróság'). 
23 Fekete 2004 
24 Fekete 2004 
25 For more about this see Gajduschek 2012  
thinking a certain duality was observable for a long time – until 1945 – according to which there 
was simultaneously a strong legal conservativism, 'living in the trance of the Corpus Iuris', and an 
up to date transmission of the most modern European achievements in legal theory and positive 
law.26 
 
IV. Effects on Hungarian public administration 
 
IV.1. Introduction 
 
The effects on Hungarian public administration may be outlined in two basic groups. It is worth 
dividing the elements of the heritage of the past which have their effects today, and the new – 
external and internal – challenges of the present. 
 
IV.2. Heritage of the past 
 
IV.2.1. Heritage of the far past 
 
Sketching the (institutional) history and continuous elements of Hungarian public administration – 
interpreted in the broadest sense – which has a history of more than one thousand years, exceeds the 
scope of this work; instead of this we wish to direct attention to some significant circumstances 
which play important role in the scientific and political discussions of the present era: 
a) the first such 'heritage-element' is tradition, which is kept alive by social memory and goes 
beyond itemised law. Today it may be observed in deep structural continuity27, the further effects of 
certain civil values, and in typical ways of thinking and attitudes. This system of values is not only 
observable in the latest legislative instruments, but also in the sphere beyond itemised law, in the 
attitude and self-image of the staff of public administration, and in the social expectations placed on 
public administration. 
b) in the second place there is the language (linguistic) environment, the framework which with its 
highly regulated nature keeps together and from several aspects determines certain features of, and 
the dogma of, public administration. Language, expert terminology/dogmatic continuities, and their 
role in influencing scientific-professional, scientific-ethical directions are impossible to overrate.28 
It is a determinative fact that the terminology of (still) valid laws – special grammatical structures or 
certain words and expressions – is often the last example of the old spoken language in the form of 
                                                          
26 Szabadfalvi 1999 
27 Hankiss 1986, 92.  
28 The National Avowal part of the document placed to the top of the hierarchy of laws states: 'We pledge to cherish 
and preserve our heritage: the Hungarian culture, our unique language, and the man-made and natural riches of the 
Carpathian Basin', and according to Article H paragraph (2) of the Fundamental Law 'Hungary shall protect the 
Hungarian language.' 
language used today. In this case the differentiation between terminology used by law and spoken 
language is very important, because the special terminology of law has always shown some 
difference from spoken language (especially when legal culture used mostly the German or Latin 
language) but today there is a huge gap also between grammatical structures used in the everyday 
Hungarian language and in legal texts which are more than 30-40 years old.  
Another important relationship in this sense is that the UNESCO 'Guidelines for Terminology 
Policies. Formulating and implementing terminology policy in language communities', published in 
2005, urging the establishment and upkeep of national terminology policy, draws attention to the 
fact that if the professional terminology of a language does not develop in certain subjects or the 
development is very slow, it may happen eventually that in today’s speedy technological 
development material communication cannot be performed after a while in the given language in 
certain professional fields (this means that functional loss of language functions may occur), and 
this may lead to the exclusion of unilingual communities from scientific development. This problem 
may be raised in relation with the direct use of English language terminology in the science of 
public administration – in the lack of Hungarian equivalents.29  
c) as third factor we may mention the most obvious heritage-element in close relationship with the 
first two: institutions which are permanently present in itemised law, those specific administrative 
solutions, which are stable and – in some cases – returning elements of Hungarian legal history. 
Regarding the latter the issue of the historical constitution may be mentioned, which has become an 
exciting problem of 'living law' in Hungary with the approval of the Fundamental Law of Hungary. 
 
IV.2.1.1. Some features of the concept of historical constitution 
 
As a feature of Hungarian history, the intensive presence of interruptions has been referred to before, 
which has always been a problem of legal continuity in relation with public law/administrative 
institutions. The Fundamental Law defines itself as a basic legal instrument restoring the historical 
constitution of the nation. Even though this 'historical constitution' is one of the main sources of the 
new structure, its meaning is defined in the preamble in an abstract way. 30  Legal historical 
experiences show that in the upkeep and reappearing of traditional law – even nowadays – the 
phenomena has an important role, according to which countries which gain their independence or 
become autonomous somehow sooner or later will incorporate into their own 'revolutionary' 
program the intention to revitalise traditional law for ideological-political reasons. 31  The 
straightforward appearance of historical constitution in Hungary in the (new) Fundamental Law – 
which has become a ground for interpreting itemised law – may be evaluated as a similar 
development.  
                                                          
29 The conference entitled 'The Renewal of the Hungarian Language and Hungarian Legal Language', organised by 
Lőrincz Lajos Research Group on 5th December 2013, also drew attention to the importance of that question.  
30 As it is stated in the National Avowal: 'We honour the achievements of our historical Constitution and the Holy 
Crown, which embodies the constitutional continuity of Hungary and the unity of the nation' and 'We do not 
recognise the suspension of our historical Constitution that occured due to foreign occupation. We declare that no 
statutory limitation applies to the inhuman crimes committed against the Hungarian nation and its citizens under the 
national socialist and communist dictatorships.' 
31 Kulcsár 1997, 129.  
Another feature of this is that the historical feature of the constitution has never meant petrification, 
naturally; a historical constitution changes too. 'However, this change is never a violent disruption 
and an introduction of a new system, but a[n organic] development, further building, the 
[continuous] incorporation of necessary reforms into the constitution.'32  
 
One possible approach to the historical constitution is the one which gives – at most – symbolic 
significance to the notion and phenomenon of historical constitution, stating that the relevant 
parts33 of the National Avowal of the Fundamental Law and of Article R) paragraph (3) only wish 
to establish and strengthen respect for the achievements of the historical constitution: 'Such 
constitutional provisions are clearly self-impulsive norms, the role of which is to trigger the effect 
of strengthening social cohesion, which is a feature of the historical constitution'.34 This is true, 
because the category of historical constitution – an independent type of norms – is difficult to fit in 
to the traditional (valid) hierarchy of norms, primarily due to its undefined content. The 
representatives of this approach believe that the historical constitution is much more the catalogue 
of the solutions of legal (public law) culture than of the sources of laws and of individual legal 
(political) solutions. Among the most cited authors, András Jakab also refuses the idea that within 
the context of the new Fundamental Law, the historical constitution shall receive more role than 
being a 'concept supporting reasoning'35. Péter Paczolay is at the same opinion: 'The Hungarian 
historical constitution – despite all efforts made for its justification – was a constitution of rather 
low value, the building of which was even more destroyed in the storms of the 20th century. Now 
some elements of certain, rather symbolic elements of the old Hungarian constitution may be kept. 
However, legal continuity is practically present only in symbolic elements today, like the coat of 
arms and the Hymn'.36  
 
However, in addition to the above mentioned – limited – historical constitution concept we shall 
also refer to a more radical concept too, which views historical constitution as a way for 
establishing itemised law expansion, an independent (and more and more dominant) method of 
legal interpretation, and common political agreements. A 'domesticated' form of this concept is an 
idea which would make an attempt to create an expandable 'catalogue of achievements' composed 
of valid individual legal institutions reappearing in positive law in order to (by taking the 
Fundamental Law seriously) give the interpreted notion real meaning, and to prevent the unlimited, 
discursive formation of domestic scientific schools which do not understand each other due to the 
use of diverse legal categories. This opinion identifies the institutional way of getting in touch with 
the past as the establishment of a careful, partial material continuity. Therefore this approach may 
be called the concept of partial material legal continuity. However, this approach also states that the 
'renationalisation' mentioned above and the adoption of certain historical legal institutions 'may be 
                                                          
32 Egyed 1941, 248. 
33 According to Article R) paragraph (3) 'The provisions of the Fundamental Law shall be interpreted in harmony with 
their goal, the National Avowal included therein, and the achievements of the historical constitution'. 
34 Csink – Fröhlich 2012, 98.  
35 Jakab 2011, 199. 
36 Paczolay 2011 
possible only in consideration of the constitutional requirements of the past period', 37 thus it 
considers it useful to establish some kind of a test in this regard.  
Article 28 of the Fundamental Law refers to the obligatory (!) use of the contents of the historical 
constitution – not quite specified by the legislator – by the law enforcers as it states: 'In the course 
of the application of law, the courts shall interpret the law primarily in light of their purpose and in 
accordance with the Fundamental Law. When interpreting the Fundamental Law or any other law, 
it shall be presumed that they are reasonable and serve the public good and morally right and 
economic purposes.' Based on the comparison of the cited paragraph of Article R) and of Article 28 
the only possible conclusion is that during their activities based on the Fundamental Law courts 
shall view the achievements of the historical constitution as a starting point – in each and every case.  
The outlines of the above mentioned two concepts are strengthened by the polemy which became 
apparent in Decision IV/2096/2012 ABH of the Constitutional Court. In the reasoning of the 
decision – examining the retiring age of judges – the following is stated: 'It is a minimum 
requirement of the consolidated interpretation of the Hungarian historical constitution to accept that 
the Acts of Parliament constituting the civic transformation completed in the 19th century form part 
of the historical constitution. These had been the Acts that had created – upon significant precedents 
– a solid fundament of legal institutions that served as a basis for building a modern state under the 
rule of law. Therefore when the Fundamental Law “opens a window” on the historical dimensions 
of our public law, it makes us focus on the precedents of institutional history, without which our 
public law environment of today and our legal culture in general would be rootless. In this situation 
the responsibility of the Constitutional Court is exceptional, or indeed historical: in the course of 
examining concrete cases, it has to include in its critical horizon the relevant resources of the 
history of legal institutions.' In this specific case the Constitutional Court did this, using the 
provisions of two laws from the 19th century as independent reasons. The separate opinion of Béla 
Pokol, however, sharply contravenes this new practice introduced in the examined field: 'Article R) 
of the Fundamental Law stipulates interpretation in light of other achievements of our historical 
constitution as a basis of interpretation, but its present unfinished nature requires us to be careful. 
The present legal historical citations from these laws in the reasoning shall only be considered as 
partial rules of a regulation in the past. If these were considered obligatory today and normative 
force attributed to them against the will and laws of the present legislative majority, then we would 
question the concept of the changeable law. In this sense I believe that Article R) shall not be used, 
because it contravenes the idea of changeable modern law.' 
Without analysing the relevant regulations of the new Fundamental Law it is obvious that in 
outlining the essence and limits of court practice 'supervising' the achievements of the historical 
constitution the Constitutional Court and the Curia will have great roles. 
 
IV.2.2. The heritage of state socialism 
 
While the cooperation of the 'Western block' after the Second World War may be described as an 
integration based on common interests, the integration of the Eastern Bloc showed the picture of 'a 
unified empire', coordination put into an absolutistic centralisation.38 The great, comprehensive 
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unification was realised in the region by establishing similar types of states (constitutions) and 
administration based on central ideas. From the aspects of operation of the system, it is very 
important that in the Eastern Bloc common political forums worked: the main issues were treated as 
political, not legal [administrative] questions. Regarding the expectations of the state from public 
administration, the priority of state interest prevailed against the expectations popular at present 
(legal security, rule of law, etc.). 
Nevertheless, by losing its political identity, Hungary did not lose fully its legal and administrative 
identity. 39  We may talk about some kind of continuity not only in the sense that our public 
administration has kept some kind of European spirit also in the era of state socialism, but also that 
'[the] organisational activities of our public administration, the rules of management, its sample 
documents, moreover, file cover documents in 1989 are very much like the K. und K. administration 
of the era before the Great War.'40 Lajos Lőrincz considers this – if we like, material, if we like, 
formal – continuity the conservativism of Hungarian public administration: '(…) the advantage of 
the cursed slowness of Hungarian public administration is shown now, in so far as forty years was 
not enough to live up to its latest idol: due to its recklessness it failed to break up all its connections 
to Europe.'41  
In the previous subchapter it has been mentioned that in Hungary the certain 'deep structural' 
continuity of civil values was observable as well. Continuing this logic, there are significant reasons 
to believe that values, attitudes and expectations of Communism have persisted after the political 
transformation. This 'instinctive logic' and often unwitting motivation may not only be observed on 
the side of administrative clients, but – as referred to before – on the side of the administrative staff, 
as well.  
 
András Tamás warns from excessive generalisations about Hungarian public administration, saying, 
'[The] public administration of state socialism is effective and cheap in many respects, while in 
reality it is absolutist and less democratic: but it would be a mistake to consider it 
“underdeveloped”.'42 
 
The further existence of the practices of state socialism and its 'recanonisation' in the process of the 
transition are not only present in the basic elements of public law/political/state organisational 
establishments, but also in the sciences of public administration. Dogmatic and scientific approach 
continuity mean, at the same time, the presence of highly similar notions and terminology (specific 
linguistic expressions) appearing at the level of legal norms, and of the continuous revival of 
scientifically accepted approaches, paradigms, canonised by the few players who know each other 
well. In addition to the advantages of this (the clear, consistent, 'politics and system-independent' 
use of well-adaptable notions) we shall also consider certain risks: the abolishment of some 
traditional 'forced mechanisms' of healthy science – done in state socialism – led to the situation 
that from the scientific journals of Hungarian public administration, the critical attitude and remarks 
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otherwise present in scientific disputes are missing (e.g. reviews – now traditionally – do not 
contain parts driving attention to the weaknesses and deficiencies of the given essay), and – with the 
exception of a few examples – the possibility of categorising authors into well separated scientific 
schools is low. It must be added that the dogmatics of public administration law is only partially 
worked out; the main sign, consequence and at the same time reason for which is that works meant 
to be scientific are often limited to the presentation of the content of laws (…).43 Naturally, the 
mentioned features only show long-term directions – which may be changed by the practice of 
decades – while the identification of real counter-directions and conscious counter-effects is also 
possible.  
 
IV.2.2.1. The revival of the solutions of state socialism – mistake or necessity? 
 
It is a fact that '[the] collapse of an empire-like public administration has a great sucking force 
which is able to bury a lot of things underneath'.44 However, it may also be observed that as we are 
getting further away from the 1980s, instinctive opposition towards the earlier solutions is 
disappearing: partly the fading of memories, partly the instinct of returning the previous patterns, 
partly the need for adequate and practical answers given to necessities emerging from the different 
crises weaken the uniformity of rejection which gave a definite 'no' to everything which was 
somehow related to the power and administrative solutions of state socialism. 
In some fields the solutions of the Kádár-era have reappeared, even though, it must be added, not 
with the intention to return to Kádárism [many of them were not even evolved (created) within the 
era of state socialism], but mainly because these solutions seemed to be adequate answers to the 
new problems, especially in those fields where the possibility of state – and material – control 
significantly decreased after 1989: e.g. in the field of public education supervision we may 
experience the return of some important elements of the structure which existed till 1985.45  
                                                          
43 Jakab 2010, 98-101. 
44 Tamás 2001, 104. 
45 Act I of 1985 on education declared the professional independence of institutions and determined the principles of 
divisional and institution management supervision. Until that time, the educational institutions operated under the 
supervision of the minister for education and the direct instruction of the authorities performing the cultural-
educational tasks of the councils’ executive committee. In professional issues, the institutions did not have 
decision-making competence; the training and educations tasks were regulated by obligatory education plans, and 
the issues of operation were defined in the obligatory rules. The directors of institutions were instructable in each 
sense. [Article 1 of statutory rule 14 of 1962; articles 2-3 of statutory rule 24 of 1965] In 1985, the authority (the 
general education supervision and the authority together) was abolished (today the general opinion is that this was a 
mistake), and instead of supervision and professional inspection a counselling activity was established which was 
regionally organised and operated in the competent (county, district) institutions providing pedagogic professional 
service. The counsellors were requested to perform the tasks by the given schools, or the maintainer commissioned 
them with an evaluation-analysis task; the services of the counsellors were available for fee, of course. The 
counsellors did not supervise, but used their professional knowledge to help and develop the work of teachers and 
public education institutions. The changes of 1993 and 2003 only brought about minor modifications in the system. 
Public law experts were selected from the list of professionals, but their professional (inspection) activities were not 
supervised by anyone. The clients usually accepted their opinions, but no one qualified the professional knowledge 
of public education experts upon a unified criteria system. On the other hand, there were no nationally unified and 
public guidelines, methods, tools and protocols available for experts, either, for performing their work, therefore 
everyone proceeded upon his (or the client’s) expectations. This is also why the establishment of a new system was 
Within this scope, the disposition of certain tasks to unsuitable types of organisations or levels after 
the transition has been another reason. In this regard it is enough to refer to the notion of district; the 
name (and partly the institutional structure) abolished in 1984 returned to Hungarian public 
administration law in 2010 as an old-new institution. 
In addition to professionally, properly reasoned conscious steps the – previously mentioned – 
unconscious mechanisms work too: earlier researchers believed that citizens favoured/favour the 
village meeting and the institution of community debate to a public hearing46, the reason for which 
in the case of the village meeting is probably – in the opinion of the researchers – that the institution 
originates from the era of councils (Act I of 1975 on councils introduced it), and thus it has a 
tradition of several decades in villages, and has been built in to public knowledge as 'classic' legal 
institution.47 
However, in summary it may be stated that a return to models and institutions similar to the 
administrative solutions of the Kádár-era does not primarily result from nostalgia for Socialism, but  
from two other factors: on the one hand it is the result of a special and continuous 'swinging',48 on 
the other hand the forces of the global economic crisis lead to solutions which shift the diverse 
administrative institutions (institutional systems) towards the growing need for state control and  
centralising solutions. The notion of swinging refers to the phenomena that at the time of the change 
of regime the rejection of the solutions of the previous system showed constrained forms: staying 
away from the magnified disadvantages of the previous solutions understated by politics often 
buried the viable (partial) solutions, well-operating practices, but with regard to these the two 
decades which have passed clearly showed which elements should be considered really 
antidemocratic, contrary to real public interests, maybe restricting individual freedoms or which 
disregard of the requirements of basic transparency and effectiveness, and which are those the 
partial reintroduction of which – in line with the requirements of the rule of law (typically ensuring 
some kind of legal remedy) – may be reasonable.  
In addition to the above mentioned information, the fact of the crisis resulted in the revival and 
spread of institutions – earlier linked to socialism – such as the conscious support of co-operative 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
necessary.  
 From 1 January 2013 education institutions – except for kindergartens – were put under state management, as 
general rule. In the new system from 1 September 2013, the evaluator expert will be also evaluated after the 
completion of his inspection by the evaluated/inspected teacher and/or manager on a special evaluation form, which 
will not only be a formal gesture. The further employment, commission of the expert will depend on whether he 
receives at least an average 60% of the maximum score with regard to the inspections conducted within five years. 
In the new system there will be three separate roles. Experts will participate in the evaluation and training of 
teachers. Those may apply to become experts who have at least ten years of experience and are registered into the 
national expert register upon recommendations. They shall successfully complete the training organised for them by 
the Education Research Institute or the Education Office and shall update their knowledge regularly. Experts shall 
have up-to-date knowledge of laws, didactic and methodological novelties. The new counsellors and subject 
referents will support the work of teachers. There is great interest for the positions: five thousand applications 
arrived for the eight hundred places. Education supervisors will perform the supervisory tasks upon a nationally 
unified system of aspects, and the third group is composed of those participating in the qualifications, who evaluate 
teachers within the framework of the teacher career model. Regarding the previous practices see Szüdi 2008. 
46 Hóbor – Varga 1998, 291.  
47 Kiss 2013, 18-20.  
48 In the field of the relationship of administrative reforms and the state Peters views the 'swinging' observed in legal 
literature into a broader context. [Peters 2008] 
forms which existed before, the introduction and strong support of new forms of these co-operatives, 
also via organisation, coordination and information supply (naturally, not by the pattern of the 
forced formation of co-operatives which happened in two waves in the '50s and '60s). 
 
IV.2.3. Heritage and consequences of the transition of 1989 
 
However, the quick transition from state socialism to capitalism left several social questions 
unsolved which were present and documented already in the 1980s and generated new difficulties at 
the level of society. This way the less controlled and otherwise forced privatisation which affected 
all sectors, the radical change of consumer habits, the very fast growth of social differences and 
social tensions (e.g. the obvious fallback of the Roma people), and the presence of large and 
uneconomical social service systems which were left unchanged led to the result that – with some 
exaggeration – the institution of careless crediting became one of the main tools of individual and 
community (e.g. self-governmental) 'success', and the money was not reinvested into production 
and into the making of products. In short this may be summarised in a way that the 'price', a sort of 
political and financial cost of bloodless, peaceful transition was the complete lack of breaking with 
the past (with its institutions, prominent leaders, ways of thinking, 'permanent reaction attitudes' 
and surviving practices). A peculiar feature of this – legally only partial – transition is the survival 
of the Constitution49 approved at the beginning of communism – in 1949 – which remained in force 
with completely new content, but under the same number and with the same structure.50  
 
Another (further) problem of our region – related to our topic, and referred to previously – is that 
'[the] expansion of the capitalist economy to the public service sector and to sectors unilaterally 
secularised earlier which are affected by market deficiencies, happened after a mechanical 
withdrawal of the state. Often in an emptied, unprepared environment, which led to the formation of 
new market failures it seems that the political sphere sometimes underestimated the related realistic 
risks (e.g. the creation of new type monopolies, clientelism), while the public considered it more 
severe than in reality.' 51 
 
After 1990 the existence of the concept of '3,200 small republics' in the self-governmental sector 
reflected on the principle which abstains from establishing clear and direct inferior-superior 
relationships, and as a counter-effect of the previous system(s) it tried to define the new 'system' be 
                                                          
49 Hereinafter the word 'constitution' refers to the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary (Act XX of 1949) modified 
with Act XXXI of 1989 which remained in force till 31 December 2011, while the expression ’fundamental law’ 
refers to the Fundamental Law of Hungary which entered into force on 1 January 2012.  
50 The constitution which was announced on 23 October 1989 to mark the anniversary of the revolution of 1956 was 
intended to be temporary (as indicated in the preamble). The establishment of the new constitution was the task of 
the Parliament formed as result of the free elections. However, the temporary constitution remained permanent and 
the new fundamental law was not created Instead, 'continuous constitution-making' was typical. During the twenty 
years which passed between 1990 and 2010 the Parliament modified the Constitution 25 times. Among these 
modifications there are some which are minor and less significant, as well as ones which may be considered partial 
revision.  
51 Horváth 2012, 13.  
as emphasizing the various freedoms. This approach caused more practical problems than necessary 
after 1990, both in the relationships of state administration organisations and local governments, as 
well as in the internal affairs of local governments (e.g. in the relationships of the representative 
body, the mayor and the clerk), and in the provision of public services.  
 
V. External effects and patterns 
 
V.1. Introduction 
 
As referred to previously, in general the political decision makers and the participating 
administrative organisations in the preparation phase of decision-making rely less and less often on 
the results of – partly foreign language – scientific research, often using these selectively and 
subsequently in order to legitimize their own decisions. Therefore there is no tight, direct and in 
each case provable relationship and unconditional synchrony between the administrative solutions 
existing in different countries and used in Hungary and the related internal and external scientific 
views. Nevertheless topics, models emphasized by domestic legal literature are more or less present 
in specific domestic solutions – this means that these constructions have definite explanatory force 
in the examination of domestic phenomena. 
To the abovementioned factors we shall add that the results of most directions (e.g. New Public 
Management) – which today have clear contents as scientific concepts – appeared in Hungary 
among the rules of law usually with a certain delay, and in a fragmented way (while the description 
and criticism of the contents of certain directions were available in works analysing the operation of 
public administration).52 The ideas, which consider the appearance of a particular (legal) institution 
and practice as a consequence of other similar practices which were known elsewhere may be 
described as classic economic mistakes, more precisely as post hoc, ergo propter hoc type false 
conclusions.53 Regarding these contexts scientific evidences are often missing (documentations and 
reasoning of proposals; the existence of statements appearing in parliamentary debates or at least at 
conferences, showing consideration of different patterns, etc.), and if their effect may be observed 
in some regards, public policy programs start, but the itemised law norms aiming at their 
introduction are usually executed in reality as program norms or are applied – in line with the 
previous practice – upon the old patterns.  
 
Since 1989, the approach of focusing on searching foreign patterns and, more and more, on the 
review of old (pre-1945) solutions has been dominant in the search for paths and directions to be 
followed in Hungary.54 At the same time (existing at the same time) external patterns mean ideal 
typical models transmitted by 'international economic sciences', the suggested solutions for general 
(global) problems and specific (individual) administrative solutions, and newly created institutions 
(see e.g. the Tobin tax phenomena and its consequences in Hungary). 
                                                          
52 E.g. Horváth 2002 
53 Samuelson – Nordhaus 1990, 640.  
54 Tamás 2001, 102. 
 The political and political economy approach dominant from the 1980s supposed that it was 
possible to balance the lack of internal capital necessary for capital market economy with the 
'import' of foreign investments. In addition to central legislation supporting this idea the 'economic 
policy' of local governments was intended to serve this for example with the forced privatisation of 
local public services, or with the occasional use of the property of local governments for business 
purposes.55  The politicians believed to have found – partially – the proper organisational and 
operational frameworks and contents of the administration facilitating economic transition in the 
institutionalisation of 'new public management' (NPM) and aimed – with some exaggeration – at 
establishing 'company-like', not authority-oriented public administration.56 
Nevertheless, even though indirectly the goals of developing an NPM-type public administration 
may be observed in what are referred to as government decisions for modernisation of public 
administration [Government decision 1026/1992. (V. 12.), Government decision 1100/1996. (X. 2.), 
Government decision 1052/1999. (V. 21.), Government decision 1113/2003. (XII. 11.), 
Government decision 1044/2005. (V. 11.), Government decision 1052/2005. (V. 23.)], formulating 
the public administration reform ideas (development goals), in these documents – in the opinion of 
Tamás Horváth M. – there is no (adequate) terminology in line with which in any cycle the 
managerial principle was (consistently) undertaken, let alone a public policy strategy built on this 
(which, with some delay, could have resembled the new public management). Moreover, the 
'borrowed' notions and institutions often became sources of difficulties (e.g. even though the 
obligatory impact study of laws was introduced, the regulations were not enforced in reality).57  
 
In certain (sub)chapters of this work, we analyse separately the administrative reforms of 2010 and 
of the subsequent years, their content, as possible answers which may be given to the crisis. Among 
these reform steps, we especially focus on the Magyary Zoltán Public Administration Development 
Programme published in the summer of 2011. In Hungarian legal literature, several analyses have 
been published which focus on the question whether the tools of the Magyary Programme are 
provenly suitable for establishing a state which is able to withstand the circumstances of the crisis. 
Within this the preconditions of the efficiency increasing measures of the Magyary Programme, the 
possibilities of coordination, flexibility and stabilisation which have become more valuable during 
the crisis, as well as their possible hampering factors.58 The separate analysis of this instrument is 
reasonable also because it has become one of the frameworks, continuously renewed and 'updated' 
foundations of the ideas of the Hungarian government after 2010 about the good state, which goes 
beyond public administration, by making principles such as adding national aspects into public 
administration, among others, equal with the requirement of effectiveness, which had been favoured 
before.59  
 
                                                          
55 Kökényesi 2012, 250-251.  
56 Kökényesi 2012, 251.  
57 Horváth 2011, 92. 
58 Gellén 2012, 12.  
59 Magyary Zoltán Közigazgatás-fejlesztési Program [Magyary Zoltán Public Administration Development 
Programme] 2012, 5. 
V.2. Possibilities and effects of 'external' models 
 
When we try to list external directions affecting Hungarian public administration – which may be 
considered a scientific concept – we must obviously take into account the public administration 
reform ideas of influential international organisations, and the administrative practices and ideas of 
the European Union, as an integration composed of national states.60  
 
In relation with international organisations, it must be highlighted that their different funding 
programs – in the past two-three decades – tried to influence the administrative reforms [SIGMA 
(OECD) program] of recipient countries (among them Hungary), sometimes even by competing 
with each other. 'From the view of the role of the state, these organisations were usually interested 
in the transfer of tasks from the central state to the market, social players or local governments',61 
and they usually promoted the models formulating these ideas. 
However, especially with regard to the good governance theories (and models) it is unavoidable to 
state that this approach does (did) not primarily react on problems originating from Western-
European development, but the artificial set of requirements made for developing/catching up 
countries, the main goal of which (was) to increase the support-receiving and utilisation capacity of 
aided countries in a way that the 'proper' regulation methods of the relationship of the state and 
society were determined, urging the need to introduce proper market mechanisms and models 
compatible with those of Western democracies.62 Nevertheless, the notion good governance still 
appears in the description attempts of the economic development features of Western (and post-
Socialist) countries.63 
 
One of the most delicate issues regarding the models of good governance is whether its notion shall 
be interpreted from the side of the result or the process; in the former case, governance which is the 
most effective in the distribution of public goods and the enforcement of public good is good 
governance, which imposes the question how to handle effective, but – in line with our present 
expectations – not democratic models, state formations (e.g. Singapore). 64  This dilemma is 
extremely relevant today – at the time of expansion of neo-Weberian concepts strengthened by the 
crises – especially in relation with the division of public and private interests. 
 
The most often mentioned element of the notion of good governance is the program of handling 
democratic deficits appearing at different stages; the main goal of the creation of the document 'On 
good governance' published by the European Commission in 2001 to transform the EU’s 
                                                          
60 These ideas often appear in detail under the explanation of the expression good administration, formulating 
recommendations for the existence of different types of organisations and the principles of proper office operation 
and behaviour at the same time. [see e.g. Váczi 2011, 9-22.] 
61 Gellén 2012, 13.  
62 Hosszú 2010, 53.  
63 Bevir 2009, 95.  
64 Hosszú 2010, 53.  
governmental system in order to bring the EU’s institutional system closer to citizens through the 
coherence of common and community policies.65  
 
Even though in the primary sources of EU law the provisions which directly regulate the state 
organisation of member states or structures of their public administration, are rare, it is undoubted 
that it has 'continuous, broad and increasing effect on it: implicitly through acquis communautaire,  
community law, and expressis verbis through the EU law, more precisely via Article 4 paragraph (3) 
of the EU Treaty',66 in so far as the latter one formulates the obligation to enforce community law (a 
need to provide results), which cannot be interpreted in other way than the state public 
administration shall be reliable, transparent and democratic.67  
Another important issue is that the European Union tried to react on growing international 
economic processes – among others – with the possibility of establishing a (partially) supranational 
'EU state', and some states have believed that the reorganisation of the destroyed balance of 
economy and state power may be possible through the creation of a 'strong nation state'. This 
process, which was significantly strengthened by the years around 2000 was completed by the 
financial crisis which started in 2008.68 
 
The negative effects of globalisation happening in the world economy, financial crises and Western 
public power responses given to them tend to indicate that the promotion of strict models as the 
only possible solutions is less and less possible. With some generalisation it may be stated that the 
OECD and the World Bank have not pushed forward any specific models since approximately 2000, 
thus the 'context matters' approach is becoming stronger. This is true even if the (economic) policy 
of Hungary, called – partly officially – 'unorthodox' made several international organisations react 
harshly to it after 2010.69 
 
One of the most important questions of the past decades was how much the narratives of the more 
or less unified Transatlantic legal and political trends – sometimes embodied in specific 
administrative models – may be spread to the other two-thirds of the world. This idea has become 
especially relevant within expectations about the handling of terrorism with the tools of law, 
because – seemingly theoretical, and herein analysed – aspects, such as the maintenance of the 
operability of law, 'the suppression of its negotiative features', and eventually the need for 
'contentual justification' has put classic, liberal legal concepts and expectations about their further 
                                                          
65 Torma 2011, 325.  
66 Article 4 parapraph (4) of the TEU:  
 'Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, 
assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties. The Member States shall take any appropriate 
measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from 
the acts of the institutions of the Union. The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks 
and refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives.' 
67 Torma 2011, 317.  
68 Kökényesi 2012, 251. 
69 About this see for example Rixer 2012, 81-82. 
expansion under extreme pressure since the beginning of the 2000s.70 Moreover, the post-2008 
crises further emphasise the sustainable and necessary nature of these needs, although we cannot 
make definite statements about the existence and future of unified Transatlantic narrative(s)… 
Nevertheless – in summary – it may be stated that while due to the different – more and more 
intensive – crises occurring around the world the establishment and strengthening of catastrophe-
prevention (legal) policies may be observed, and at the same time there is a greater need than ever 
for balance, negotiations and sustainable solutions. During severe crises discussion, partnership and 
de facto cooperation between determinative players are evaluated – which, obviously, has 
consequences in positive law.71 
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